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FOREWORD: INTERDISCIPLINARITY 
Kathleen M. Sullivan* 
In the beginning, there was law. Then came law-and. Law and 
society, law and economics, law and history, law and literature, law 
and philosophy, law and finance, statistics, game theory, psychology, 
anthropology, linguistics, critical theory, cultural studies, political 
theory, political science, organizational behavior, to name a few. The 
variety of extralegal disciplines represented in the books reviewed in 
this issue attests to this explosion of perspectives on the law in legal 
scholarship. 
This development makes clear that the vocation of the legal 
scholar has shifted from that of priest to theologian. No longer is a law 
professor successful by virtue of well-informed and detached 
normative prescription directed to those toiling at practice, 
policymaking and adjudication. No longer is the highest aspiration of 
the law professor to restate the law or lead the bar. Instead, legal 
knowledge is perceived to advance through techniques of 
measurement, explanation and interpretation, the positive and 
analytic tools of the social sciences and the humanities. 
And yet we continue to owe our jobs as law professors, with our 
special place and privileges within the university, to teaching lawyers 
the tools of practice. We still publish casebooks and respond to 
requests from judges, legislators, and businesses for advice. The 
analytic techniques of the law school classroom continue to follow the 
ancient professional folkways of taxonomy and synthesis, analogy and 
distinction, even as enhanced by power-point slides and quantitative 
techniques. The life cycle of many legal theorists includes a period of 
policy-oriented prescription, offered in op-eds, public testimony, or 
consulting memoranda. We thus live a curiously bifocal existence, 
viewing law close up by day, and from an external vantage point by 
night, both insiders and outsiders to our profession. 
To some of those who practice and apply law, this development 
represents decline and fall. A decade ago, in the pages of this law 
review, Judge Harry Edwards famously lamented that "many law 
schools . . . have abandoned their proper place, by emphasizing 
abstract theory at the expense of practical scholarship and pedagogy," 
thus dissociating the legal academy from the legal profession in a 
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centrifugal spiral.1 In his view, law professors no longer spoke 
sufficiently directly to judges, litigators or legal policymakers from a 
shared internal perspective in a language that was intelligible or 
useful. In his view, the article or book that truly concerned law was a 
rare occasion for celebration. 
To others, especially non-legal academics who toil in the underpaid 
precincts of university disciplines outside the basic sciences, this 
development represents an unjust windfall. In their view, law 
professors who do interdisciplinary work are practicing social science 
and humanism without a proper professional license, acting as are 
historians, economists, or political theorists manquees, but 
nevertheless reaping high salaries and lavish worldly opportunities (at 
least by university standards) merely by virtue of having obtained a 
law degree. In their view, our erstwhile interdisciplinary articles in the 
peculiar venue of student-edited journals represent law office history, 
noisy regressions, synthetic social science, or adulterated critique, all 
freighted with unnecessary references and footnotes that could sink a 
thousand ships. The accompanying emotions of contempt and envy 
are tempered only by the nervous suspicion that there may be 
mysteries to the legal priesthood inaccessible to the uninitiated, and 
mysterious power in the legal sacraments capable of actually affecting 
events in the outside world. 
I reject both these critiques, and argue here that current trends 
toward interdisciplinarity in legal scholarship are cause for excitement, 
not lament. The extreme implication of the first critique is that law 
schools ought be increasingly partitioned from the rest of the 
university, specializing in practical education with little affinity for 
other disciplines; the extreme implication of the second critique is that 
law schools ought be dissolved as distinct entities and absorbed into 
the university's various other departments. The far better third 
alternative, in my view, is to retain the distinctive institutional place of 
law schools as post-graduate professional schools within the university, 
while continuing to lower the barriers to exchange between scholars of 
law and other disciplines university-wide. On this third view, the rise 
of law-and scholarship has elevated both our knowledge of how law 
works and our teaching of how to practice it. Hence the importance 
and justified influence of this annual, interdisciplinary book review 
issue of this law review. 
The argument proceeds in three steps. First, I briefly reiterate the 
sometimes overlooked point that law is itself a discipline, not simply a 
hologram or pastiche of other disciplines. This feature supports the 
institutional autonomy and distinctiveness of law schools. Second, I 
note that this discipline, the discipline of law, is itself multidisciplinary, 
1. Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal 
Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34, 34 (1992). 
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built upon if not reducible into elements of the humanities and social 
sciences. Thus, attempts to fragment law teaching, law professors, or 
legal scholarship into the "practical" on the one hand and the 
"theoretical" on the other are artificial and misleading. Third, I 
conclude that interdisciplinarity in legal scholarship is not just an 
exercise in consumption by law professors, but has productive utility 
both for the university and - as is sometimes overlooked - for legal 
practitioners and the many political, corporate and bureaucratic actors 
who provide services to society built in some part upon their legal 
training. 
To begin with, law is itself a discipline. Organizational charts of the 
disciplines often focus on content, or the taxonomy of subject matters 
studied. Of course, law is a discipline in this sense. Legal rules,. 
documents and judgments comprise a rich and complicated body of 
texts distinct from novels, equations, or musical scores. And law 
involves a rich and complicated body of institutional arrangements 
that structure and regulate social order, distinct from the institutional 
structures of markets, cultures, and religions. 
But a discipline, as the term itself suggests, also represents a 
technique, a method of analysis, a way of working. Here too, law is 
distinctive. It is a branch of rhetoric that gives normative force to 
interpretation and analysis. It is a set of interpretive techniques of 
problem-solving that disaggregate and order the messy jumble of facts 
through which conflict presents itself. And it is an amalgam of 
argumentative and decisional conventions, engrained through 
repetition, teachable only through reiterated practice and critique, as 
with etiquette, musical performance, or sport. 
If you have any doubt that legal method is distinctive, try reading a 
non-lawyer's attempt to state the holding of a judicial opinion. With 
rare and brilliant exception (Linda Greenhouse, Nancy Rosenblum, 
Austin Sarat come to mind), even the cleverest non-lawyers routinely 
garble such summaries, seeing holdings in cert. denials, constitutional 
rules in statutory constructions, substantive shifts in remedial rulings, 
big swings in molecular motions. Legal journalism routinely commits 
political mapping fallacies, announcing that the Supreme Court is 
"turning right" only to recant a term later to say that "the center 
holds." The equivalent in etiquette is the faux pas; in music, singing off 
pitch; in sport, the duff, the <link, the mulligan. Lawyers know better 
because of our immersion and internalization of our discipline, a social 
practice that turns out to be a lot harder than it looks. 
But law, though a discipline, is not and never has been an 
autonomous discipline. The regulation of social order through a 
variety of authoritative texts necessarily interacts in complex and 
dialectical fashion with the content and techniques of the social 
sciences and the humanities. To take a few familiar examples, criminal 
law, in its classification of crimes and its hierarchy of punishment, 
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reflects a mixture of deontological and utilitarian theories of 
blameworthiness and deterrence. Constitutional law enforces a set of 
institutional design mechanisms rooted in liberal political theory about 
how to constrain government tyranny. Contract law reflects theories 
of personality, will and agency on the one hand and of allocative 
efficiency on the other. These theories are often incompletely 
articulated in legal materials, and they are sometimes conjoined in 
ways a pure humanist or social scientist would deem inconsistent, as if, 
for example, philosophers as deeply different as Kant and Mill could 
be cited for the same proposition in the alternative. But however 
incompletely or inconsistently, legal rules and opinions are always 
implicitly theorized. To teach law necessitates fluency in, if not 
specialization in, the disciplines that underlie the law in more or less 
articulate fashion. 
This would be so even if no interdisciplinary books or articles 
existed to elaborate the connections. It simply is not possible to 
explain a decision limiting the power of the federal government over 
the states, for example, without implying a political theory of the 
comparative advantages of centralized and decentralized government. 
Nor is it possible to explain shifts from individualized tort liability to 
social insurance or from the law of landlord-tenant to the regulatory 
devices of rent control or land use controls without implying economic 
theories of market failure or philosophical theories of distributive 
justice. Even without explicit footnotes or cross-references to other 
disciplines, such legal rules represent a reflective equilibrium between 
particular fact situations and general theories that are necessarily 
extralegal. Law is a social practice that embodies a complex 
intersection of theories; it is not a theory unto itself. 
This much is intuitive to American law students who, unlike those 
law students in Anglo- or continental educational systems who 
specialize in law as undergraduates, arrive at law school as post­
graduates, already steeped when they arrive in the disciplines of the 
humanities or social sciences (although basic scientists are usually a bit 
flummoxed by what we do). They can see implicit economic theory in 
contract remedies and implicit political theory in the law of state and 
local initiatives and referenda. Such applications of theory are likely to 
appear mid-level, neither as pure as high theory nor as nitty-gritty as 
legal or judicial war stories. But it is precisely at that middle level of 
generality that law school arbitrages the multiple disciplines 
underlying it with the practical problems its teachings are meant to 
help solve. Law school training is in large part an exercise in imparting 
nimbleness at negotiating disciplinary divides in particular settings. 
For these reasons, even work that some would describe as 
"doctrinal" in today's legal literature is rarely simply that. The attempt 
to explain or rationalize patterns of judicial or administrative decision­
making necessarily draws upon implicit theories in order to make 
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interpretations, assessments and predictions. To describe Rehnquist 
Court decisions in the areas of federalism, voting law and associational 
liberty as expressing an overall tendency to favor decentralized 
decisionmaking whether by state agencies, political parties, or boy 
scout troops is implicitly to draw upon political or social theory, 
whether or not Madison or Tocqueville is expressly invoked. To 
taxonomize the modes of dispute resolution employed in response to 
mass injuries ranging from asbestos inhalation to tobacco use to the 
September 11 World Trade Center deaths is implicitly to draw upon 
conceptions of distributive justice, whether or not Rawls or Sen is 
explicitly referenced. Even student law review notes that chronicle 
unresolved issues in lower court litigation, which might seem the last 
bastion of pure doctrinalism, implicitly articulate tensions in social 
theory, such as the tension between normative pluralism and uniform 
human rights norms embodied in the seemingly technical question 
whether race discrimination by a charter school constitutes state 
action. Legal doctrine interacts dialectically with social practices in a 
way that always and everywhere implicates theoretical debates. That 
the fluent lawyer might use case names as shorthand for describing our 
legal system's provisional resolutions of these debates hardly purges 
"doctrine" of its theoretical components. 
If law is a discipline, that itself draws upon multiple disciplines, 
then what is the role of the self-consciously interdisciplinary work in 
law that increasingly characterizes the work of the legal academy? 
There are three possibilities: first, that the application of the tools of 
other disciplines will improve knowledge about the law and 
institutions governed by law; second, that the application of the tools 
of other disciplines will improve the practice of law and the quality of 
legal rules and institutions; and third, that viewing the law through the 
lens of other disciplines will add understanding and knowledge to the 
other disciplines. 
Before canvassing these possibilities, let me stress at the outset that 
each possibility depends upon the work being done knowledgeably 
and well across disciplinary boundaries. Just as non-lawyers are 
capable of being ham-handed in describing law, legal academics are 
capable of being ham-handed in recounting or applying economic, 
social and political theory. The optimistic view sees both sides 
handling the other's tools with precision and care, free as much as 
possible from the exclusionary effects of local jargon, and in a spirit of 
mutual collegiality and respect. 
The first proposition is perhaps the easiest to establish. Both 
positive and interpretive interdisciplinary work adds to legal 
knowledge. Positive research looks at the "is" rather than the "ought" 
of law, or how the law actually works in practice. Expertise from 
economics, social theory, or political theory enables legal scholars to 
describe, measure and assess how well legal rules, practices and 
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institutions perform at the functions expected of or ascribed to them, 
such as the achievement of justice, fairness, equal treatment, social 
welfare, or international harmony. Through such research, the 
external perspective illuminates the success or failure of those working 
within the internal perspective. 
The rise of positive research and thus the increasingly empirical 
study of law is one of the most dramatic trends in recent legal 
scholarship. Do independent directors constrain management? Do 
takeover defenses prevent deadweight loss? Do shareholder class 
action suits deter management error, confer windfalls on plaintiffs, or 
none of the above? Does alternative dispute resolution save 
transaction costs? Do concealed handgun laws save lives? Does the 
legalization of abortion lower crime rates? Does recession increase the 
number of employment discrimination claims? Does affirmative action 
increase black income and wealth? Is venture capital a substitute for 
bank financing? Does the expansion of state sovereign immunity shift 
relative power from the federal government to the states? Do tax 
shelters increase productivity? Do judges deprived of sentencing 
discretion use charging discretion as a substitute? Does the death 
penalty deter crime? Does race determine the allocation of the death 
penalty? 
Answering each of these questions increases our knowledge of how 
law works, whether well or badly along the axis of a function defined 
in advance. Such research does not assert normative premises but 
takes them as given. This branch of interdisciplinary scholarship 
comes closest to the mores of the basic sciences, which test 
explanatory hypotheses against observed data. Research in this vein is 
often an equal opportunity ideological offender, offputting to trial 
lawyers, ADR lobbies, civil rights advocates, and the like, whenever it 
puts doubt to conventional wisdom or tendentious assertion. 
Interpretive scholarship, drawing on the techniques of philosophy, 
literary analysis, history and cultural theory, in contrast, does not 
measure legal outcomes against a pre-assigned function, so much as 
seek to articulate the function, including the expressive function or 
social meaning, implicit in legal materials. Does the presumption 
against unconstitutional conditions reflect a philosophical conception 
of coercion or a political theory of governmental incentives to 
overreach in relation to private ordering? Does a preference for 
bright-line rules over flexible standards reflect tacit assumptions about 
the trustworthiness of the implementers' exercise of discretion? Did 
Brown v. Board of Education help end the racial segregation of public 
education? Do racial gerrymanders preserve divisive race 
consciousness? Is the effective articulation of universal human rights 
possible in a world of fragmented and mutually exclusive local belief 
systems? Does the law of the free exercise clause presuppose that 
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religious faith is or is not prior to government in the view of its 
adherents? 
Notice that there is nothing mutually exclusive about pursuing 
these two kinds of interdisciplinary work. A single article might well 
seek to examine, for example, whether the creation of majority­
minority voting districts advantages Republicans in the ensuing 
electoral cycle, and whether such gerrymandering conveys a socially 
undesirable .message of apartheid (or vice versa). The point is that 
both the positive and the interpretive strands of legal scholarship take 
a stance outside legal rules, decisions and institutions in order to 
describe, explicate, and assess their social role. Such scholarship starts 
from the irreverent proposition that nothing in law need be as it is, 
and that critical rationality can illuminate whether it's doing what it 
claims, and if not, how it got that way, whether through cognitive bias, 
ideological skew, factional dominance, path dependency, or cultural 
norms. 
The question might be asked why law professors need do such 
work; why not simply leave all this to scholars in the humanities and 
the social sciences? The answer is that legal expertise enables positive 
and interpretive legal research to depict institutional reality in all its 
complexity, without overly simplifying assumptions. Specialization in 
the internal structures and rhetoric of law improves the quality of this 
research in both its positive and interpretive dimensions. A scholar 
concerned only about the efficiency of intellectual property 
monopolies in conserving incentives to create might not take account 
of the administrative difficulties of case-by-case adjudication of 
infringements. A scholar concerned only about the magnitude of 
money flows in international crime might not take account of the 
nuances of prosecutorial practice in charging money laundering in 
addition to the underlying crime. Internal knowledge of how lawyers 
behave improves the external analysis of legal behavior. 
Nor does the practice of the external perspective by law professors 
necessarily diminish skill at teaching students the internalist skills of 
performance. Sometimes external and internal skills simply converge; 
many a great composer has been likewise a great musicologist. In my 
observation over nearly a decade each teaching at Harvard and 
Stanford Law Schools, I have observed many a proud and non­
practicing legal theorist revealed as a closet lawyer when, for example, 
mooting a colleague's upcoming oral argument or predicting an 
awaited decision. Likewise, teaching internalist skills does not 
necessarily depend on having them; many a great music teacher or 
athletic coach have been less than stellar performers in their own 
right. Thus the gains to legal knowledge offered by the increased 
interdisciplinarity of legal scholarship pose no danger to the quality of 
professional legal education. 
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Indeed I would go farther, and assert, as a second proposition, that 
increased interdisciplinarity in legal knowledge affirmatively improves 
the teaching of law, and thus improves the professional preparation of 
lawyers whether they enter legal practice or business or public 
policymaking positions. Thus the outpouring of scholarship 
represented in this issue, extending the methods of history, 
philosophy, literary analysis, political science, psychology, economics, 
and so forth to law, can improve rather than derogate from legal 
pedagogy. Of course, this depends on keeping the law school tethered 
to the production function of its graduates, not the consumption 
function of its professors. The application of historical analysis to the 
federal rules of civil procedure or literary analysis to the federal 
sentencing guidelines is a far cry from abandoning courses on 
procedure for seminars on myth, language and law. 
Interdisciplinary scholarship can improve the production of 
lawyers for the betterment of society in at least three ways. First, and 
most straightforwardly, some techniques of other disciplines that may 
be taught in law schools provide law students with skills that are 
directly useful and applicable in legal settings. A law professor fluent 
in the language of the other disciplines for scholarly purposes will 
likely convey useful interdisciplinary knowledge in the classroom as 
well. Because legal decisionmakers rarely confront problems as strictly 
legal ones, labeled with a T for torts or B for bankruptcy, but rather as 
messy jumbles of legal, scientific, financial, ethical and institutional 
challenges, interdisciplinary expertise in this straightforward, 
utilitarian sense is desirable preparation for practice and 
policymaking. 
For example, a knowledge of statistics enables a litigator to cross­
examine expert witnesses or a government lawyer to analyze 
departmental data. A knowledge of finance theory enables a 
transactional lawyer to better structure debt and equity instruments. A 
knowledge of marine biology enables an environmental lawyer to 
assess the damage to an aquatic ecosystem for purposes of seeking 
administrative or judicial relief. And it would be downright perilous to 
teach advanced courses in intellectual property without some 
advanced knowledge of the computer science that constructs the 
Internet or the structure of the human genome, knowledge that 
students in tum will need in practice. 
Interdisciplinary knowledge improves the teaching of law in a 
second sense as well: it illuminates the tacit theories underlying the 
mix of statutes, regulations and judicial precedents that comprise the 
law. For example, the first-year curriculum still contains a course in 
contracts, as it did a century ago, but law professors steeped in the 
literature of law and economics, libertarian social theory, or 
distributive justice will teach the architecture of the doctrine in a more 
structured and organized way than a professor who simply points out 
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that contract cases leaning respectively toward objective and 
subjective interpretations of contract formation are mutually 
inconsistent. The effective lawyer may still need to employ multiple 
theories in pursuing particular outcomes, but it cannot but be helpful 
to know which one you're deploying, just as it is useful to know when 
you're speaking German and when French. 
More subtly, interdisciplinary knowledge that is explicitly 
conveyed in legal teaching helps students to absorb, as part of the 
social practice of law, the deep structure of the ideological and 
institutional tensions that law helps to resolve. Private law subjects are 
illuminated as playing out deeper tensions between allocative and 
distributive concerns in the operation of markets. Public law subjects 
are situated in broader debates about which topics are, and are not, 
better decided by majoritarian political processes rather than by 
private ordering or specialized expertise. The student with an 
architectonic understanding of the larger debates will subsequently 
better see how the same tensions reappear in miniature, as smaller 
oppositions nested within the larger ones. 
Third, the interdisciplinary law professor can elevate the quality of 
public debate over any number of topics, from gun control to cloning 
to the enforceability of international human rights. Interdisciplinary 
legal scholarship gives lawyers better bases for suggesting or assessing 
potential law reform, regulatory regimes or shifts in judicial decision­
making. Law professors have no superior claim to normative insight 
over many other contributors to public policymaking, but are experts 
in the mutual translation of legal into social, economic and political 
concepts, and vice versa. Deeper immersion in the tools of economics, 
history, statistical analysis, and political science can help enhance the 
persuasiveness of any policy prescriptions legal scholars do tender to 
the public. And legal scholars, by virtue of being lawyers (or in the 
case of non-lawyer law professors, steeped by osmosis in legal 
folkways like Jane Goodall among the chimps), are more likely than 
straight economists or historians to leaven theoretical advice with 
concerns about institutional design and practical administrability. 
Finally, increased interdisciplinarity in law offers gains not only to 
law, but also to the other disciplines within the university. Too often, 
the non-legal disciplines see law as a planet unto itself, impervious to 
contemporary trends in thought, or slow to awaken to them after a 
considerable lag time. But law offers rich material for analysis and 
reflection by non-lawyers. The continued lowering of walls erected 
between law and other disciplines out of institutional turf battles, or 
misguided mutual isolationism, is sure to produce better thought and 
analysis on both sides. 
Interdisciplinary research is increasingly the touchstone in the 
basic sciences; universities such as Stanford, for example, have 
ambitious plans to bring biologists, medical researchers and engineers 
1226 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 100:1217 
together to pioneer new insights and techniques in "bioengineering." 
No one thinks these three departments ought to merge, nor their 
specialized disciplinary standards be diluted. But the potential gains 
from collaboration are evident to members of each of these three 
intellectual communities. 
Similar gains from collaboration are evident to the scholars who 
attend law school workshops in law and economics, law and 
humanities, law and history, law and environmental science, law and 
philosophy and the like. The law professors at these workshops are as 
often as not also great lawyers and teachers of legal practice. The non­
lawyers in attendance are as often as not well attuned to the particular 
structures and nuances of law. Legal scholars need not choose 
between practical and theoretical destinies, nor non-legal scholars be 
exiled from the precincts of law. To the contrary, interdisciplinarity 
promotes synergy and enlightenment, as the editors of the issue that 
follows have so richly and commendably demonstrated. 
